A cooperative game with transferable utility is said to be homogeneous of degree one if for any integer m, the value of cloning m times all players at any given coalition, leads to m times the value of the original coalition. We show that this property coupled with sub-additivity, guarantee the non-emptyness of the core of the game and of all its subgames, namely the game is totally balanced. Examples for games stemming from the areas of retailing, and facility location are given. Subject classifications: Games/Group decisions: cooperative. Are of review: games, information and networks.
Introduction
A cooperative game with transferrable utility is defined by a set of n players, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, that can form coalitions. Specifically, any subset S of players in N , can cooperate, where ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N is called a coalition, and S = N is also called the grand-coalition. Each coalition S is associated with a real value denoted by V (S), where V (∅) = 0, that represents the total cost inflicted on the members of coalition S if they cooperate. Note that once a coalition is formed, it is irrelevant to its members what the other players are doing, and in particular, which coalitions they form. The function V : 2 N → is called the characteristic function of the game. The pair G = (N, V ) is said to be a cooperative game with transferable utility. A game G = (N, V ) is called sub-additive if for any two disjoint coalitions S and T , V (S ∪ T ) ≤ V (S) + V (T ). Sub-additivity ensures that the socially best partition of the players of N to disjoint coalitions is when all players cooperate and form the grand-coalition N . Sub-additive games bear the concept of economies of scope, i.e., when each player, or set of players, contributes its own skills and resources, the total cost is no greater than the sum of the costs of the individual parts.
A prerequisite for the stability of the grand-coalition is an agreement on fair allocation of the cost V (N ) among the players of N . Several fairness concepts have been proposed in the literature. One of the most appealing among them is the core: A vector x ∈ n is said to be efficient if n i=1 x i = V (N ), and it is said to be a core cost allocation if it is efficient and i∈S x i ≤ V (S) for any ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N . The collection of all core allocations, called the core of the game, is a simplex that is defined by n decision variables and by 2 n − 1 constraints. Thus, finding a core allocation for a given game, except for specific ones having special structures, may be an intricate task. Indeed, this issue coupled with the possibility that the core is empty, makes the problem of finding a core allocation, or showing that the core is empty, a real challenge.
A game whose core is non-empty is said to be balanced. A balanced game for which all its 2 n−1 subgames are also balanced is said to be totally balanced. There exist examples that show that sub-additivity by itself does not guarantee balancedness of the game. Moreover, a game that is not subadditive is also not totally balanced as for any disjoint S and T of N for which, V (S) + V (T ) < V (S ∪ T ), the subgame (S ∪ T, V ) has an empty core since any efficient allocation of V (S ∪ T ) among the players of S ∪ T will be objected by at least one of the coalitions, S or T .
We focus on sufficient conditions for a sub-additive game to be totally balanced. To the best of our knowledge, the following are the only two wellknown general sufficient conditions for a game to be totally balanced. In this paper, we propose a new sufficient condition for a cooperative game to be totally balanced. First, we present the two known sufficient conditions:
Condition 1 Concave games: a game G = (N, V ) is said to be concave if its characteristic function is concave, meaning that for any two coalitions
Condition 2 Market games: (see [6] and Chapter 13 in [3] .) Suppose there are types of inputs. An input vector is a nonnegative vector in + . Each of the n players possesses an initial commitment vector w i ∈ + , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which states a nonnegative quantity for each input. Moreover, each player is associated with a continuous and convex cost function f i :
Actually, a necessary condition for a game to be totally balanced is that the game can be reformulated as a market game, see [4] . Therefore, in theory, the class of totally balanced games coincides with the class of market games. The snag is that if a game is not presented naturally as a market game, reformulating it as such (or showing that such a reduction is impossible), is an intricate job by itself, and hence this approach is not very useful. Thus, in the sequel, we refer to market games as games that are originally formulated as in Condition 2, or games that a reduction to the form of a market game is known.
Conditions 1 and 2 allow the characteristic function to be quite general as it may assign values to coalitions arbitrarily and independently of the profile of its members. In particular, the characteristic function may assign different values to two players that are identical in all aspects except their identity. In practice, many cooperative games are symmetric in the sense that they do not exploit this freedom of the definition, and de facto, identical players/coalitions that differ only in the identity of their members, affect the characteristic function in exactly the same way. In such games it is easy to generalize the definition of the characteristic function to any set of players, not necessarily subsets of N. In a previous paper [2] we formalize this idea by introducing the class of regular games where players, except for their own name, are fully characterized by some quantitative properties.
For example, a tax payer is identified by his/her S.S.N. (identity) and is characterized by a number of quantitative properties, e.g., his/her income level, tax allowance, tax credits, etc. A game is said to be regular if the characteristic function assigns to any collection of players, not necessarily players of N , a value which is computed via a closed form expression of the quantitative properties of its players, and is not a function of their identity. In the next section we formalize this notion rigorously. In [2] we also identify a class of regular games called regular market games and a reduction scheme that reduces these games to market games, proving, according to [4] , that they are totally balanced.
Condition 3 Regular market games: follow the definition of market games in Condition 2, with the following differences: (i) the functions f i in (1) are identical, i.e., f i ≡ f for all i ∈ N , so that the cost associated with a player is independent on its identity. (ii) The total of the commitment vectors of the players should be allocated among the players and an external agent, where the cost of allocating commitments to the external agent is linear. That means that there exists a linear function h : + → , with h( 0) = 0, so that equation (1) is replaced by
In addition to the abovementioned three classes of games, a few structural games have been identified in the literature as totally balanced. Of particular interest here is the class of permutation games: Let Π(N ) be the set of all permutations of N. A permutation π ∈ Π(N ) is a one-to-one function from N to N, and Π(S) = {π ∈ Π(N ) : π(i) = i for i ∈ N \S}. In order to present our new sufficient condition for total balancedness, we generalize a well known property of real functions to characteristic functions of regular games, namely the property of homogeneity of degree p:
Definition 1 A game is said to be homogeneous of degree p if for any integer m, the characteristic function value of cloning m times a collection of players, is m p times the value of the original collection of players.
The main result of this paper is that sub-additivity and homogeneity of degree one of the characteristic function of a regular game imply total balancedness. That means, that within the class of sub-additive games, four subclasses of games that are totally balanced are currently known: (i) concave games; (ii) market games; (iii) permutation games; within the class of regular games also (iv) regular market games; and (v) homogenous of degree one games. These subclasses are not disjoint, for example, the class of homogenous of degree 1 games contains both the class of regular market games and also the subclass of games with are both regular and permutation games. We refer to such games as regular permutation games. In fact, the state-of-the-art level of characterization of the core of a game depends on the class that the game belongs to: A full characterization of the core is known only for concave games, see [5] . For market games, and as a consequence also for regular market games, a single core allocation based on competitive equilibrium prices is proposed in Chapter 13 in [3] . A single core allocation for a permutation game is obtainable by solving a linear programming problem consisting of 2n variables and n 2 constraints, see [4] . Our result on total balancedness of homogenous of degree one games, leaves open the challenge of identifying core cost allocations for such games.
The contribution of this paper stems from the fact that there exist subadditive and homogenous of degree one games that are not concave, neither they have the form of regular market games, or permutation games. This paper proves that such games are totally balanced.
In the next section we define regular games. In Section 3 we present two examples of regular games one in retailing, and one in facility location. The examples are of sub-additive regular games that are neither concave nor are presented as regular market games or as regular permutation games, and therefore it is impossible to invoke any of the sufficient conditions mentioned above in order to prove that these games are totally balanced. In Section 4 we present formally the homogeneity of degree one property, and the key theorem of this paper, which states that sub-additivity and homogenous of degree one of the characteristic function of a regular game, is sufficient for total balancedness. The examples in Section 3 can easily be shown to be homogenous of degree one, proving that they are also totally balanced. In Section 5, the theorem is proved.
Regular Games
A cooperative game G = (N, V ) is defined by its set of players N and its characteristic function V . This definition is useful as long as one considers just the players in N. However, in general, one may want to consider adding new potential players to the game. As currently presented, the characteristic function is not applicable for such cases. In many settings this limitation is artificial as each potential player of the game is characterized by a vector of quantitative properties, hereby called a vector of properties, and it affects the cost of any coalition that it joins only by this vector through a closed form mathematical expression that is independent of the player's identity.
A regular game G = (N, V ), see [2] , satisfies the following conditions: there exists κ ≥ 1 resources, indexed by = 1, . . . , κ. Each player i ∈ N is fully characterized by the resources' quantities that he/she owns. That means that player i ∈ N is associated with a vector of properties y i ∈ κ , so that y i denotes the quantity of resource , 1 ≤ ≤ κ, that he/she owns. The vectors of properties of the players may be required to satisfy some feasibility constraints of the form y ∈ D, where D ⊆ κ . Some of the resources are sharable among the members of a coalition, while the others are non-sharable. In some games all resources are sharable. Non-sharable resources serve as attributes (parameters) of the players. The characteristic function value V (S) of coalition S ⊆ N, is a function of the |S| vectors of properties of the members of S, and is otherwise independent of the identity of its members. V (S) denotes the cost induced by the members of S when they share the sharable resources according to the rules of the game. Let y (m) denote a sequence of m vectors of properties y 1 , . . . , y m in D. The following two definitions formally define a regular game:
. is said to be Infinite Increasing Input-Size Symmetric Sequence (IIISSS) of functions for given integer κ ≥ 1, and a subset D of κ , if
• There exists a vector y 0 ∈ D such that V 1 (y 0 ) = 0 and for any given
For a given IIISSS of functions (V m ) m≥0 , V m receives as input m vectors of size κ, each is a member of the set D, and it returns a real value. As the functions V m are symmetric, the order of the m input vectors has no affect on the value of the function. The third item of the definition guarantees that the definition of the various functions of the IIISSS of functions is consistent, i.e., it excludes the possibility that there exist two functions V and V k for = k, , k ≥ 1, where each is defined by a different mathematical expression. This is achieved by requiring to have a null vector of properties y 0 ∈ D that links the different functions through a forward recursion. For example, suppose that each player i is associated with a certain score α i and the value of a coalition is the average score of its members. In such a case let κ = 2, player i is associated with a vector y i = (α i , 1), the null vector is y 0 = (0, 0) and
is the average score of the nonnull vectors in D. Note that the choice of y 0 as the zero-vector is a quite natural choice for a null vector that holds in many other games. But in some games y 0 is not necessarily the zero vector. Consider a similar example to the above one with a characteristic function that for any coalition returns the product of the scores in the coalition divided by the number of players in the coalition, i.e.,
In such a case the null vector y 0 = (1, 0), and V 1 (y 0 ) is defined as 0. Observation 1 A market game G = (N, V ), as described in Section 1, is not a regular game in general, as the cost function of a player may depend on its identity. A market game is a regular game if all individual cost functions f i (·), i ∈ N , are identical, i.e. f i ≡ f for all i ∈ N..
The sub-additivity of an IIISSS of functions is defined as follows:
Definition 4 An IIISSS of functions V 0 , V 1 , V 2 , . . . is said to be sub-additive if for any two finite sequences of vectors of properties in D, (y i A )| i∈A and
In [2] we identify two types of IIISSS of functions that generate many regular games. In the next section we consider two examples of regular cooperative games that do not fit the structure of these two types. In addition, none of the them can be proved to be totally balanced by using the sufficient conditions described in Section 1.
Examples
The first example deals with a situation that we often encounter in sales, where we don't pay for all the items that we buy. Suppose that the items in the store are partitioned into k categories for some k ≥ 2. If a customer buys k items, one from each category, then she gets for free one of the items whose price is the cheapest among the k items she picked-up. We call such a sale a (k − 1) + 1 sale.
Example 1 Consider a department store that announces a (k − 1) + 1 sale for k different and disjoint categories of items. The sale is such that if one buys one item from each category, she gets for free one item whose price is the cheapest. Suppose the different categories are indexed by 1, . . . , k. A customer that takes advantage of the sale is associated with a vector of properties of size k, (x i 1 , . . . , x i k ) ∈ k + , where x i j represents the cost of the item in category j that customer i picks up. This customer, if acting individually, pays k j=1 x i j − min{x i j : j = 1, . . . , k}. Cooperation among customers of a group S ⊆ N may generate some savings. Let V (S) denote the minimum payment that coalition S can achieve by reassigning the items of the different categories among its customers.
In order to present the game as a regular game let the set of feasible vectors of properties be D = {(x 1 , . . . , x k ) : x j ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , k} where the null vector is the zero vector. Let Π(N ) be the set of all permutations of N, and Π(S) = {π ∈ Π(N ) : π(i) = i for i ∈ N \S}. Let also σ 1 , . . . , σ k be k permutations in Π(N ), where permutation σ 1 is the identity permutation, i.e., σ 1 (i) = i for i = 1, . . . , n. The characteristic function of the (k − 1) + 1 sale game is defined by
For any integer m ≥ 1, let P(m) be the collection of all permutations of the sequence (1, . . . , m), where permutation σ 1 is the identity permutation. Define the IIISSS of functions V m , m ≥ 0, as follows:
We provide now a simple procedure that determines the characteristic function value for any coalition and for k > 1 categories of items. Claim 1 specifies an optimal sequence of permutations that minimize (3):
Claim 1 Let σ j ∈ P for j = 1, . . . , k be k permutations, with σ 1 being the identity permutation, and x
Proof: The proof is by induction on m, the size of the coalition. For m = 1 the proof is trivial. Consider i = m and the following vector of properties
) that consists of the prices of the most expensive item in each of the k categories. In any reassignment of the items among the customers of the coalition it is necessary that the coalition pays for all the k − 1 most expensive items inx. Thus, without loss of generality, we assign these k − 1 items to customer m, so that customer m is assigned items in all categories except for some category ∈ {1, . . . , k}. Accordingly, the price of the most expensive item in category that has been purchased by a member of this coalition is x σ (m) , by definition ofx. As there is at least one item in category that the coalition gets for free (the one assigned to customer m), and the objective is to minimize the cost, the most expensive item in category is assigned to customer m. The problem then repeats itself with a coalition of m − 1 customers, and the set of m − 1 cheapest items in each of the k categories. The proof then follows by induction.
The IIISSS of functions given in (3) is sub-additive as when an optimization problem is involved in defining the functions (V m ) m≥1 then the optimal solution for a set A of vectors of properties coupled with the optimal solution for a disjoint set B of vectors of properties is still feasible for A ∪ B. Yet, a better solution can be found for A ∪ B.
The following instance of a 1 + 1 sale game shows that (k − 1) + 1 sale games are not concave, see The formulation of the (k − 1) + 1 sale game in (3) does not look as a formulation of a market game, see Condition 2 in Section 1, or as a formulation of a regular market games, see Condition 3 in Section 1, as we deal here with a discrete rather than a continuous optimization. The special case of a 1 + 1 sale game with two categories, and one pays for the most expensive item of the two, is a regular permutation game and therefore it is totally balanced, see Section 1. In the next section we show that also the general (k − 1) + 1 sale game is totally balanced.
Our second example is from the area of location of service facilities:
Example 2 Suppose that a number of towns who are part of a bigger metropolitan need the service of a fire station. Each can have its own station at a dedicated place. Cooperation can take place when a number of towns use the same station. The goal is to minimize the distance between the center of the town and its closer station. Specifically, let x i ∈ 2 be the center of town i and let y i ∈ 2 be the default location of its fire station.
In particular V 1 (x, x) = 0 for any x ∈ 2 × 2 . The sequence V m for m ≥ 0 is an IIISSS of functions with D = {(x, y) ∈ 2 × 2 : max{ x , y ≤ ρ} ∪ {(z, z) ∈ 2 × 2 : z > 2ρ} for some constant ρ > 0. The pair (z, z) serves as the null vector and therefore it is chosen so that z is a large number relative to the input implying that pairing a town in D with (z, z) is never optimal. In view of the above presentation the game is regular. It is easy to see that this game is sub-additive. The following example shows that it is not a concave game. Let N = {1, 2, 3} and assume x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = (1, 0), that y 1 = y 2 = (1, 0) and that y 3 = (10, 0). Let S = {1, 3} and T = {2, 3}. Thus, V ((1, 3)) = V ((2, 3)) = 0, V (S ∪ T ) = 0 and V (S ∩ T ) = 81. Clearly,
, refuting a possible conjecture that this game is concave. For the same reasons as Examples 1, this game does not look as neither a market game nor as a regular market game, or a permutation game.
The new condition that we present in Section 4 will easily prove the total balancedness of these three cooperative regular games.
Homogeneity of degree one
We now present the homogeneity of degree one property for regular games. For this sake we need the following notation:
Definition 5 Given a regular game G = (N, V ) that is associated with D ⊆ κ , and a sequence A of vectors of properties in D let A (p) be a set of vectors of properties in D containing p replicas of any member in A.
Definition 6 An IIISSS of functions (V m ) m≥0 (with the corresponding set D) is said to be homogeneous of degree p, p ≥ 0, if for any given sequence A of m vectors of properties in D, V mp (A (p) ) = m p V m (A). In particular, for p = 1, an IIISSS of functions is said to be homogeneous of degree one.
Definition 7 A regular game G = (N, V ) whose IIISSS of functions (V m ) m≥0 is homogenous of degree p, is said to be homogeneous of degree p.
Example 3 Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of n M/M/1 queueing systems that cooperate in order to minimize the steady-state congestion in the combined system. Queueing system i is associated with its own exponential service rate µ i and its own Poisson arrival rate of λ i , λ i < µ i , i ∈ N . Cooperation of a set ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N results in a single M/M/1 queue whose service rate is µ(S) = i∈S µ i , and whose arrival rate λ(S) = i∈S λ i . The cost associated with coalition S, ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N , is defined as the resulting mean number in the system. Let G = (N, V ) be the respective game where V (S) = λ(S) µ(S)−λ(S) for any S, ∅ ⊆ S ⊆ N. This game was analyzed in [1] : The game is sub-additive but it is neither concave nor it looks as a market game. Still it is proved in [1] that the game is totally balanced and its nonnegative part of the core is fully characterized. In particular, it is shown that x i = (λ i / j∈N λ j )V (N ) is a core allocation. The game is regular: Each service provider i ∈ N is assigned a vector of properties of size 2, namely (µ i , λ i ) in D = {(x, y)|x > y ≥ 0} ∪ {(0, 0)}, where (0, 0) is the null vector, and the IIISSS of functions
. Regarding the homogeneity property defined above, it is easy to see that this game is homogenous of degree zero.
Homogeneity of degree one means that when two (or more) identical sets of players cooperate, they cannot do better than what they did when acting individually. At the same time, they do not interfere each other. What they produce is just the total of what they would have produced separately. This in fact means constant return of scale. Note that subadditivity means that gains due to cooperation are possible. This when coupled with homogeneity of degree one, mean that in order to get a strict improvement, the cooperating sets should be different, i.e., at least one of the cooperating subsets should contain types of players that do not appear in the other set. In contrast to that, consider again the game presented in Example 3 and analyzed in [1] : This game is both sub-additive and homogenous of degree zero. Indeed, homogeneity of degree zero implies that when k identical coalitions cooperate the total cost is reduced by 1/k. Thus, in this example both economies of scope and economies of scale prevail. It is easy to verify that: Example 1 (cont.). The (k − 1) + 1 sale game given in (3) with D = {(x 1 , . . . , x k ) : x j ≥ 0 j = 1, . . . , k}, is homogeneous of degree one. Example 2 (cont.). The location game given in (5) 
Next we state our main theorem. The proof is deferred to Section 5.
Theorem 1 Any regular game which is sub-additive and homogeneous of degree one, is totally balanced.
Theorem 1 is a new sufficient condition that helps us to resolve the question if the games in Examples 1, and 2 are totally balanced: Example 1 (cont.). The regular (k − 1) + 1 sale game given in (3) is subadditive and homogenous of degree one, and therefore it is totally balanced. Example 2 (cont.). The location game given in (5) is sub-additive and homogeneous of degree one, and therefore it is totally balanced.
Theorem 1 provides a sufficient condition for total balancedness but it does not say how to generate cost allocations in the core for such games.
This remains an open question.
Proof of Theorem 1
We start by reviewing a well known necessary and sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core of a cooperative game, see, e.g., [3] , Chapter 13. This condition is equivalent to the duality condition of a feasible linear programming formulation. Specifically, let C be the set of all 2 n coalitions of N . For any coalition S denote by S , the |S|-dimensional Euclidean space in which the dimensions are indexed by the members of S, and denote by 1 S ∈ R n the characteristic vector of S given by The following proposition is referred to as the Bondareva-Shapley Theorem, see, e.g., Proposition 262.1 in [3] :
Proposition 1 A coalitional game with transferrable utility has a nonempty core if and only if it is balanced.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 1. Proof: We prove the theorem by using Proposition 1 in two steps. We first prove that for any vector of balanced rational weights (α S ) S∈C , the inequality S∈C α S V (S) ≥ V (N ), holds. Then we prove that the same is the case for any balanced collection of real weights.
Consider any balanced collection of rational weights (α S ) S∈C . Let M (α) be a positive integer such that τ S (α) = M (α)α S is an integer for all coalitions S ∈ C. As the game G = (N, V ) is regular, there exists an integer κ ≥ 0, such that each member i ∈ N is associated with a vector of properties y i ∈ κ . Let y i j = y i for any integer j ≥ 1. Regularity of the game implies that V (S) = V |S| ((y i )| i∈S ). As V is homogenous of degree one, V τ S (α)|S| ((y i j ) (i,j)∈S (τ S (α)) ) = τ S (α)V (S). Note that S∈C τ S (α)V (S) = S∈C V τ S (α)|S| ((y i j ) (i,j)∈S (τ S (α)) ) ≥ V M (α)n ((y i j ) (i,j)∈N (M (α)) ) = M (α)V (N ),
where the above inequality follows by the sub-additivity of V in the regular game G = (N, V ), and specifically, sub-additivity of V over N (M (α)) that contains M (α) repetitions of each player of N . Consider now the l.h.s. of the inequality, i.e., S∈C V τ S (α)|S| ((y i j ) (i,j)∈S (τ S (α)) ) : for any i ∈ N, we have also here S∈C: i∈S τ S (α) = M (α) S∈C: i∈S α S = M (α) copies of each vector of properties y i , as (α S ) S∈C is a balanced collection of weights. The last equation follows from the fact that in the regular game G = (N, V ), the characteristic function V is homogenous of degree one. To conclude, S∈C τ S (α)V (S) ≥ M (α)V (N ). Recall that τ S (α) = M (α)α S , thus dividing the last inequality by M (α) gives the desired result for any rational balanced collection of weights (α S ) S∈C .
In order to complete the proof, we need to show that the above property holds also for any vector of balanced real weights. Let (α S ) S∈C , be a balanced collection of real weights. Consider the simplex induced by the constraints that define the set of balanced weights, i.e., (α S ) S∈C ≥ 0, and S∈C, i∈S α S = 1 for all i ∈ N . The extreme points of this simplex are rational, as the righthand side of the constraints as well as the coefficients of the variables are 0 or 1. Let K be the number of extreme points of this simplex, and let α j for j = 1, . . . , K, be the respective extreme points, where each α j is a vector of size |C|. Thus, (α S ) S∈C , can be represented as a convex combination of the extreme points: Let (γ 1 , . . . , γ K ) be the respective weights, so that 0 ≤ γ i ≤ 1 for i = 1, . . . , K, K j=1 γ j = 1, and (α S ) S∈C = K j=1 γ j (α j S ) S∈C . As each of the extreme points of the simplex is rational and is a vector of balanced weights, we have S∈C α j S V (S) ≥ V (N ) for all 1 ≤ j ≤ K. Therefore, S∈C (α S )V (S) = S∈C K j=1 γ j α j S V (S) = K j=1 γ j S∈C α j S V (S) ≥ K j=1 γ j V (N ) = V (N ).
